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In the previous chapter, I identified some effects on use of physicians'
own services which may be caused by physician availability. Some kinds
of physicians' services, such as surgical treatment, almost surely imply
additional use of hospital facilities as well. In this chapter, I wish to
investigate more deeply the determinants of hospital use, and of those
physicians' services provided in connection with hospitalization, espe-
cially with regard to the relationship between the availability of hospital
and physician inputs and hospital use.
The Relationship between Hospital Inputs and Use
There seems to be little a priori reason to expect that the availability
of hospital inputs should lead to physician creation of demand for hos-
pital care, and physicians seem to be the only group with the ability to
create demand for hospital admissions. That is, there is no obvious
reason why the mere availability of hospital inputs should lead a physi-
cian to try to affect patients' demand for medical care. If hospital inputs
can be obtained at some vector of prices, the level of those inputs that
would be chosen by a real-income-maximizing group of physicians will
be based on the output to be produced and the relative prices (net of
insurance) of hospital and other inputs. But this choice of inputs is sim-
ply the derived demand for inputs—it is determined by the demand for
final output. It does not in any way determine that demand. The only
connection between inputs and final output is through the effect of input
prices on the quantities of inputs chosen, and on the consequent effect
of those input costs on the price of final output. In this sense, the level
of hospital inputs is wholly endogenous, and the availability or quantity
of such inputs would not affect use in a casual sense. If hospital inputs
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are wholly endogenous, the quantities of those inputs should not affect
the provision of information or any other way of shifting demand.
There are, however, reasons to suppose that the quantity of hospital
inputs may not always be set at the level which physicians would de-
mand. The most likely outcome is that the level of inputs will be low
relative to what physicians would demand, so that excess demand will
be observed. There are three possible causes of such an outcome. First,
even if the hospital is run in the interests of physicians, there may be
limitations on the hospital's ability to raise equity capital, which may in
turn restrict its ability to provide physical or working capital. The num-
ber of donations to the hospital may have a direct influence on its capital
stock, and may also affect the terms at which it can borrow. Second, the
hospital's administration or trustees may not want to provide the inputs
physicians and patients desire. It is an open empirical question whether
the hospital's administration has the power to implement its desires, or,
if it does, how one might characterize its preference function. But it is
surely possible that it may choose not to provide inputs which physicians
want, so that there will be excess demand. (Alternatively, the hospital
may desire to provide facilities that patients and physicians do not
want.) Finally, since demand for hospital services is stochastic, there
will almost surely be temporary periods of excess demand (or excess
supply) at the profit-maximizing level of inputs or even at other higher
input levels. The self-limiting nature of many illnesses, or the possibility
of substitution of ambulatory care for inpatient care, may turn such
temporary shortages into permanent reductions in demand.
It is also possible that donations may be so large that the hospital has
more capital than physicians would have desired if the opportunity cost
of the capital had had to be covered by hospital charges. Such excess
capital is, in the physicians' view, equivalent to donation of the implicit
interest. It would, nevertheless, be expected to be put to use. In this
sense, if the marginal unit of capital is raised from donations, actual
capital stock may be treated as exogenous.
In what follows I will consider each of these three possible reasons
for an availability effect for hospital care. The goal will be to see what
they imply about the possible existence and causes of that effect. For
purposes of present discussion, the supply of physicians will be taken to
be exogenous.
Permanent Excess Demand
Suppose that hospitals are restricted in their ability to add beds, even
though physicians acting as perfect agents would demand those beds for
patients with some level of insurance coverage. Since the hospital must
price approximately at average costs, there is no direct way in which the93 Hospital Beds, Hospital-oriented Physicians, and Hospital Use
hospital price can be raised to ration demand. Feldstein has suggested
that, in such circumstances, the physician will be under pressure to share
capacity with others.
1 While this may be so, some form of nonprice
rationing would obviously have to be used even in the absence of ex-
plicit pressure. Conversely, were there no excess demand, bed avail-
ability should not have a direct effect on the physician's desire to use
beds or on the advice he gives to patients. The physician who is a perfect
agent will only want to ration care if there is excess demand. He may
try to keep "his" beds free in order to take care of an unexpected case;
if the number of beds increases, he can admit more patients and still
maintain the same safety margin. It is this excess demand, not the pres-
sure on physicians, which is likely to be the ultimate cause of an avail-
ability effect. Any pressure on physicians, implicit or explicit, is only a
manifestation of excess demand already present.
In the longer run, Feldstein describes a process of hospital price
adjustment to excess demand that comes about through increases in the
costliness, input intensity, and the quality of hospital care. What he
ignores, and what may be critical, is the role played by physicians and
their prices for services they provide in connection with inpatient care.
Feldstein does provide a discussion of physician ambulatory services.
As he suggests, these services may well be substitutes for hospitalization,
and the conventional opinion is that there is a "shortage" of such pri-
mary care services. In such a case, the quantity supplied of such services,
i.e., the position of the supply constraint, would indeed be more relevant
than the price in determining actual use. The situation is more compli-
cated if some observations display excess demand and some do not.
Then prices may be relevant as well, although the precise econometric
specification of the relationship is unclear.
But the point that Feldstein omits is that many physician services are
complementary to hospital use. In the case in which the demand-for-
admissions function can be written QH =- Q(PM -\- PH), where PM is the
physician's user (net of insurance) price (e.g., the uncovered portion
of the surgeon's fee) and PH is the hospital's user price, there is obvi-
ously a very strong form of complementarity. It implies not only that
dQn/dPM < 0, but that dQn/dPM = dQH/dPH.
Such strong complementarity would have important implications for
the existence of permanent and continuous excess demand for hospital
services. If there is no excess demand for hospital-oriented physician
services such as surgery (which almost surely is the case), there can be
no excess demand for hospital services either. Suppose demand and
supply of hospital admissions are equated (given insurance coverage)
at some set of prices PM, PH- NOW let PH be depressed below PH, to PH', but with no corresponding increase in supply. Excess demand for hos-
pital services will occur. Hospitals may choose not to raise their prices.94 Chapter Six
But this excess demand can also be eliminated by a rise in the price of
physicians' services to PM' so that PM
f + PH = PM + PH- If physicians'
prices are sufficiently flexible upward, even a "shortage" of hospital beds
need not lead to permanent excess demand.
Feldstein's explanation is that excess demand is gradually reduced as
hospitals raise their prices and costs by shifting to higher "quality" care.
The alternative explanation here is that at least part of the price rise
occurs as increased physicians' fees. With the definition of what consti-
tutes a physician's service and what constitutes a unit of hospital output
fixed, there appears to be no alternative to this form of strict comple-
mentarity. As long as hospitalization requires fixed proportions of both
hospital and physicians' services, such an explanation will be the appro-
priate one. Feldstein's explanation of how equilibrium is achieved in the
market for hospital care may be seriously misleading.
Is there any sense in which a rise in the user price of hospital service
would not have an effect on the demand for hospital services equal to
that of a similar rise in the price of physicians' services? To the extent
that the ratio of hospital to physician inputs can be varied, such a differ-
ence is surely possible. A decline in the user price of a day of stay, e.g.,
the room rate, will increase the demand for hospital admissions, but it
will also lead to an increase in desired length of stay. Physicians' charges
typically do not vary with length of stay or with other amenities. How-
ever, even here, since the same input (beds) is used to produce both
admissions and days of stay, there cannot be an excess demand for beds.
The supply of beds can be rationed by altering the number of admissions
as well as by altering length of stay. Indeed, if physicians collectively
can exert some control, one would expect them to favor a stay-intensive
"bed rationing" policy, one which concentrates on shortening stays,
rather than on an admissions-intensive policy, precisely because physi-
cian income depends more on admissions than length of stay.
The above discussion suggests that when beds are in short supply,
physician prices will be higher, and it suggests that hospital prices alone
may give an adequate explanation of hospital demand only if user prices
PM and PH are highly correlated. Such correlation is probably present in
general; whatever the case with gross prices, hospital insurance coverage
and insurance for physicians' services in hospital are highly correlated
(as one would expect, since they are really the "same" insurance). What
is critical, of course, is whether physician prices are sufficiently flexible
upwards so that they will clear the market. At this point, we do not
know whether they are or not.
Another less likely possibility is that there may be excess supplies of
beds. This would generally result from incorrect planning, from demand
shifts, or from overly generous public subsidies or private donations.95 Hospital Beds, Hospital-oriented Physicians, and Hospital Use
From the viewpoint of the hospital's administration or trustees, using
those empty beds would probably be desirable. But there are no direct
incentives to physicians to have them filled, no direct physician gain
from admitting an additional patient whom the physician would not have
wished to admit in the absence of empty beds. The hospital's financial
condition can, however, have some indirect effects on physician deci-
sions. If filling an empty bed reduces a deficit that threatens hospital
survival, physicians collectively may agree to shift or tailor patient de-
mand to fill empty facilities.
If the hospital is not in such difficulties, filling empty beds may still
mean additional hospital profits (or smaller losses). Whether or not
filling empty beds increases hospital profits depends on how the hospital
is paid. If insurance pays wholly on the basis of costs, additional filled
beds may please the administrator who values output, but they do not
add to profits as long as incremental insurance reimbursement exactly
equals incremental cost. If reimbursement exceeds marginal costs, and
if filling of empty beds does not seriously affect the hospital's ability to
handle peaks in demands, then physicians might be willing to create
some additional demand if they can benefit in some way from the hospi-
tal's increased flow of profits.
One avenue of benefit would be the use of profits from filled beds to
subsidize other outputs the hospital produces. Since the amount the
physician can collect for the physician-hospital joint product increases
as the hospital price is reduced, such a strategy would be a way of trans-
ferring the hospital's profits to physicians. Since the utility loss to the
physician from increasing demand above what he would have chosen in
the absence of excess beds is initially very small, and since the gain to
him from hospital profits is positive, some demand creation would make
him better off. A second strategy is for the hospital to use the additional
profits for capital improvements which enhance physician income or
utility. This strategy would be more likely to be chosen if the hospital
could not transfer its profits directly to physicians. If it could transfer
profits, the hospital which happens to have earned profits would make
investments it would not have made in the absence of funds from profits
only if there were restrictions on its ability to borrow. Note that, in all
cases, the incentive to increase hospital demand must be imposed collec-
tively on physicians. Otherwise, each individual physician would prefer
to ride free; he would prefer to maintain his own level of accuracy while
gaining from the hospital profits generated by other physicians' demand
creation efforts.
Thus it is theoretically possible for an excess supply of beds to induce
physicians to engage in more information manipulation, although the
connection between an individual physician's reduction in accuracy and96 Chapter Six
his income is not nearly so direct as for physicians' services themselves.
Whether or not bed-availability effects actually do differ across educa-
tion-information groups provides a test of the coincidence between the-
oretical possibility and reality.
Physicians and Hospital Administrators
If permanent excess demand does not necessarily arise from supply
side restrictions, can it arise because hospital administrators refuse to
provide beds that physicians and patients both demand and are willing
to pay for through insurance? Such an event surely seems implausible.
It is more likely that hospital administrators will desire more output
than do physicians. Indeed, the supply of beds might be expected to be
restricted by a physician cartel, but such restrictions would probably
be opposed by individual hospital administrators.
Even empty beds may satisfy the administrator's desire for a large
plant to manage. Of course, empty beds may also embarrass him or
cause him financial difficulties.
Stochastic Demand
A more likely explanation for excess demand for hospital beds than
any of those discussed so far is provided by the stochastic nature of
demand. There can be temporary excess demand. The reason is simple:
it will not ordinarily be desirable to build a hospital of such a size that
there will never be excess demand, and it is impossible to vary prices to
eliminate temporary shortages. Beyond some point, beds cannot be sub-
stituted for other inputs, or vice versa, to permit the hospital to deal with
all levels of demand. So there will sometimes be excess demand; the
level of total hospital demand will be inversely related to the probability
of shortage, and directly related to bed supply. If the hospital is some-
times full, ambulatory care may be substituted, or the patient's condition
may cure itself while he waits for a bed. Whatever the mechanism by
which the choice is made, not all communities will end up with the same
probability of shortage. Those communities in which the probability is
smaller will, of course, have more use of hospitals. The possibility of
temporary excess demand, therefore, provides a plausible explanation
for an effect of hospital beds on hospital use.
When a hospital does happen to be full, there will be pressures on
physicians to ration beds. One would expect that this rationing would
have to be done on some collective basis, even if only implicitly. Physi-
cians may even manipulate information to reduce the level of demand
to hospital capacity. The critical point, however, is that physician be-
havior is solely a response to excess demand, and does not require a
separate theory of demand creation. There may still be some differences97 Hospital Beds, Hospital-oriented Physicians, and Hospital Use
between educational groups in the extent to which their demands can be
affected by whatever form of nonprice rationing physicians choose, al-
though there is no a priori reason to expect differences.
Physicians and Hospital Use
What might be the effect of physician availability on hospital use?
For those physicians who primarily provide substitutes for inpatient care,
such as general practitioners, use of hospital services might be expected
to decrease with an increase in the absolute or relative number of such
physicians (prices held constant), if there is an availability effect on the
demand for ambulatory services. Where there is no such effect, only the
relative prices of hospital substitutes would be relevant. With regard
to hospital-oriented physicians who provide complementary inputs, such
as surgical specialists, anything that increases the use of these physicians'
inputs will also increase the use of the associated hospital inputs. It is
generally agreed that there is an excess supply of many of these comple-
mentary physician inputs, especially general surgeons. An observed avail-
ability effect is therefore unlikely to arise from even temporary excess
demand. If a physician availability effect occurs, it almost surely must
come from information manipulation. For some other specialties, such
as internal medicine, the prediction is ambiguous, since we do not know
whether they are primarily producers of substitutes for or complements
to hospital care.
If there is true demand creation, one should therefore look for an
availability effect running from surgeon stock to use of surgeons' services
in hospital. That such an effect exists has been suggested in the empirical
literature, most strongly by Bunker, who found high rates of surgery
matched by high rates of surgeons per capita in a comparison of the
United States to England and Wales.
2 Lewis found that for some (but
not all) surgical procedures there was a significant relationship between
surgeon availability and surgery.
3 Wennberg and Gittelsohn also found
this relationship, especially at the extremes of their small number of
observations, but it seemed to break down at the level of individual
surgical procedures.
4 This is perhaps not unexpected; there is no reason
to suppose that demand creation, if it occurs, necessarily takes the same
form everywhere.
Empirical Tests
The basic form and set of exogenous variables for the hospital de-
mand equations that are presented in the next section are the same as
for the physician visit equations in chapter 5. Independent variables are
defined in the same way. Since federal hospital beds are not included
in the measure of BEDS*, persons with episodes in federal hospitals98 Chapter Six
were dropped from this sample, reducing the sample size slightly from
that used in chapter 5.
Because any effect of beds on use will probably not come from infor-
mation manipulation, there is no a priori expectation that there will be
a difference between education-information groups in the coefficients
measuring the effects of bed availability on either length of stay or ad-
missions. If education somehow proxied time cost, and given suitable
differences in the form of the demand function, some differences might
emerge, but it would be difficult to predict them a priori. Indeed, the
effect of stochastic excess demand may be too small to detect, especially
if the occupancy rate is low enough that the hospital is rarely full.
Length of stay should depend primarily upon hospital and patient
variables, but not directly on physician availability or price. One caveat
is, however, suggested by the results in chapter 3. If a larger number of
physicians per capita means more physician time spent at the hospital,
this additional input may reduce length of stay. Since we have no accu-
rate measure of the price of such an input, but only an overall index of
physician medical or surgical fees, it is possible that in those areas where
there are relatively many physicians and in which patients demand larger
amounts of physician inputs per day of stay, stays may be shorter. Such
an inverse relationship between physicians per capita and stay may be
telling us more about production technology than demand.
Physicians would be most likely to have a demand-creation effect in
the case of those hospital admissions in which surgery is performed.
The surgically treated episode measures both the output which is of
concern to the surgeon—the surgical procedure he performs—and the
use by the patient of complementary hospital inputs. The relevant mea-
sure of availability here would be surgical specialists per capita. The
fraction of physicians who are G.P.'s is also included in order to mea-
sure, in a crude way, the possibilities for substitution of nonsurgical for
surgical forms of treatment. The physician price variable for surgically
treated episodes (MDFEE) is a weighted average (over general practi-
tioners and specialists) of the 1973 Medicare prevailing charge for
hernia repair. For total hospital episodes, the followup office visit fee is
used as a general index of physician fee levels. Finally, the number of
hospital-based physicians per capita is included to take account of pos-
sible substitutes for surgical specialists. Ideally, we would like to have
known the fraction of hospital-based physicians who are surgical spe-
cialists, but this fraction should be highly correlated with the total.
Results
Table 6.1 indicates the results for tobit and OLS regressions using
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multiple episodes, many had zero, and about 80% of those with some
admissions had just one admission.
Admissions Rates
The effect of beds on hospital admissions per year is positive in all
regressions, but is significant only for high education families in rural
areas. F-tests indicate that the hypothesis of equality of the sets of re-
gression coefficients across the education subsamples cannot be rejected
at the 95% level for the rural and other metropolitan samples. The sets
of coefficients are different for the large urban sample, but in that sam-
ple the coefficients on BEDS* do not differ significantly.
5 The results are
therefore consistent with the hypothesis that an effect of availability of
beds on use, if observed, should not be attributed to demand creation
or information manipulation. Physician variables (OBMD* and HBMD*)
more frequently have a negative than a positive effect on use, but are
significant only for the high education persons in large cities in the OLS
regression. As discussed in chapter 5, physician variables for this sub-
sample have a significant negative effect on the use of ambulatory physi-
cians' services as well.
Physician and hospital prices frequently have a negative effect on use,
as does the absence of insurance coverage, but these variables are sig-
nificant only for a few of the subsamples. The composition of the physi-
cian stock (GP/MD and SURG/MD) has no consistent effect on use
of hospitals. Finally, variables measuring health status, work status, age,
and female of childbearing age are almost always significantly related
to use in the expected directions.
To summarize: availability variables generally have little consistent
or significant effect on admission rates in these educational subgroups.
The question of the effect of availability variables on total hospital ad-
missions will be discussed in more detail below. These results for the
subgroups do suggest, however, that the primary determinant of use is
the health status of individuals, not the availability of beds or physicians.
Length of Stay
The results for length of stay, shown in table 6.2, display a similar
pattern. Stay is more frequently positively related to beds, but the effect
is small and is significant only for the high education subgroup in smaller
metropolitan areas. Stay tends to be shorter where physicians are more
plentiful, perhaps because more physicians can monitor their hospital-
ized patients more closely. Gross prices and physician stock specialty
composition are unrelated to length of stay, while the existence of insur-
ance coverage has negative but inconsistent effects.
Patient characteristics variables have the expected effects on stay,
although the effects of health status variables are estimated less pre-102 Chapter Six
Table 6.2 Average Length of Stay Regressions, All Episodes
(OLS)
Regression Coefficients (/ statistics in parentheses)
Nonmetropolitan
22 Largest SMSAs Other SMSAs Areas
Independent
Variable or Low Head High Head Low Head High Head Low Head High Head
Statistic Education Education Education Education Education Education
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Table 6.2—continued
Regression Coefficients (t statistics in parentheses)
Nonmetropolitan
22 Largest SMSAs Other SMSAs Areas
Independent •
Variable or Low Head High Head Low Head High Head Low Head High Head
Statistic Education Education Education Education Education Education
n 496 218 375 363 529 295
F statistic for hypothesis
of inequality of regression
coefficients 0.99 1.58 0.08
F.os (19, large n) = 1.57
NOTE: Means and standard deviations are shown in appendix table 3.
cisely than in the other regressions. Children, women, and persons who
are working tend to have shorter stays, and older persons longer ones.
Surgically Treated Hospital Episodes
It is widely believed that there is an "excess" of surgical specialists.
While this definition is usually based on technical notions of how much
work a surgeon can do, rather than on behavioral notions of how much
work the surgeon is willing to do, one can interpret it as suggesting that
there is an excess supply of surgeons' services. It will therefore be de-
sirable to see whether the amount of in-hospital surgery (measured by
the number of surgically treated hospital episodes, other than those for
delivery) is related, ceteris paribus, to the stock of surgical specialists
available to perform surgery.
Table 6.3 indicates the results of regressions of surgically treated
hospital episodes using the same set of variables as before, except that
SURG/MD has been deleted and surgical specialists per capita (SURG*)
has been substituted for office based physicians per capita. The results
for surgical episodes are similar to those obtained in the analysis of all
hospital episodes. Hospital beds tend to be related positively to use, but
the effect is not very strong nor is it measured very precisely; as in the
case of all hospital episodes, it is significant only for high education
families in rural areas. Physician stock specialty composition and gross
price are not strongly related to the use of surgery. What is perhaps most
striking is the finding that the number of surgical specialists per capita
is not significantly related to the amount of surgery for any of the edu-
cation-location subgroups. Indeed, the coefficient on this variable is
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s fc, .5 ft,106 Chapter Six
could possibly be explained for persons living in rural areas by the fact
that they may travel out of their primary sampling unit for care, very
few of the persons in SMSAs are likely to leave the metropolitan area.
In summary, the results do not differ across education subgroups, and
are not even positive or significant. In view of these striking results (or
nonresults), a more direct test of the existence of any availability effect
for surgical services will be presented in the next section.
The effects of other independent variables on the use of surgery are
similar to those in the overall hospital episodes regressions. Health status
measures are strongly related to use: sicker people are more likely to
have had surgery. Somewhat surprisingly, consumption of surgery tends
to be highest, ceteris paribus, among the middle aged (45-64). There is
a weak positive relationship between the frequency of surgery and fe-
males of childbearing age status, and a weak negative relationship with
being employed. Insurance is fairly strongly related to the use of surgery
for the lower education group, while family income is weakly related.
Availability Effects and the Use of Hospitals
The original hypothesis of the availability effect, often called Roe-
mer's law, was derived from a study which found a positive relationship
between the number of hospital beds and their use.
6 In a similar way,
the notion that surgeons cause surgery is a strong point of health ser-
vices research folklore, even though the results in the often-cited study
by Lewis do not, in fact, provide very strong statistical support for the
proposition.
7
In the education-area subgroups investigated in this study, however,
no such availability effects were found. F-tests shown in tables 6.1 to
6.3 indicate that, in many of the subsamples, it is preferable to permit
the coefficients to differ by education subgroups. In principle, one
should therefore test for the overall effect of any variable, such as
BEDS* or SURG*, by including it interacting with the education dum-
mies, and by interacting all other independent variables with those dum-
mies. In practice, the large sample size makes such a procedure costly,
and the results are often difficult to interpret in any case. As an alterna-
tive, we examined OLS regressions on data combined for all education
groups within each area, as well as data aggregated over all areas.
Dummies were introduced for education or location; no further inter-
action was attempted.
The results in table 6.4 do suggest that there is a weak effect of
BEDS* on total admissions for the full sample (all education groups,
all areas) even though the effect was not significant for the subsamples.
Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is in any case quite small, with an107 Hospital Beds, Hospital-oriented Physicians, and Hospital Use
elasticity of about 0.1. BEDS* has no overall effect on either length of
stay or surgical admissions.
As before, we find that neither the surgeons per capita variable nor
the other measures of physician stock are significant in any of the aggre-
gated surgical episodes regressions. Physician stock and measures of the
composition of physician stock likewise have no effects on total episodes
or on length of stay. Physician availability does not belong in regressions
describing hospital use.
An effect which does come through much more clearly in these aggre-
gated samples is the effect of insurance on hospital use. Since almost all
high education families have coverage, a no-insurance dummy was used
to indicate only those low and middle education persons without cover-
age. For both total episodes and surgical episodes, there is a highly
significant negative effect of lack of insurance coverage on use. The
calculated admission rate for persons who lack insurance would be about
30 to 40% less than for persons with insurance. A somewhat surprising
offset, however, is that persons with insurance tend to have significantly
shorter stays than persons without insurance. The two effects nearly
cancel out in terms of expected hospital days, although insurance cov-
erage still probably has a positive effect on total expenditures.
Gross physician fees or hospital prices (which tend to be positively
correlated) do not have a significant effect on total episodes, surgery,
or length of stay. At a relatively low level of significance, there is a sug-
gestion that high hospital prices reduce length of stay, while high surgi-
cal fees (especially in big cities) tend to discourage surgery. The results
of these aggregate regressions are therefore roughly similar to those
obtained from the disaggregated regressions. Availability effects on hos-
pital use are small or nonexistent, and do not appear to arise from de-
mand creation.
In particular, more surgeons do not mean more surgery. In contrast,
a recent study by Fuchs, using the same data presented here but aggre-
gating it into regional rates, presents the finding that surgeon availability
is related to surgery rates, although the effect is relatively small (an
elasticity of 0.3).
8 How can this finding be reconciled with those pre-
sented here?
There are two possibilities. First, this study has used many more per-
sonal characteristics, especially health status measures, than did Fuchs.
While he did use 2SLS and treat surgeon stock as endogenous, possible
correlation (whether causal or not) between health status variables and
the variables used to predict surgeon stock could lead to the finding of
a spurious effect.
Second, there is a potentially important group of consumers which
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Fuchs' rates. This is the group of persons in families with incomes below
a poverty line. They were deleted from our sample because many of
them may have had Medicaid coverage not measured in our data set.
One may speculate that availability effects might be concentrated among
this group to an extent sufficient to lead to measurement of an overall
availability effect. Since members of this group are especially likely to
be in families with heads of low education, the possibility is especially
likely.
In summary, it appears that there is little evidence of an overall avail-
ability effect for hospital episodes, whether surgically treated or not.
With the possible exception of the very poor, physician stock is unre-
lated to patients' use of hospitals, and beds are only weakly related. It
does not even appear that surgery is more frequent where surgical spe-
cialists are more common.